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The three spacecraft that made up the Space Technology 5 (ST5) mission were 
successfully launched and deployed fi-om their Pegasus launch vehicle on March 
22, 2006. Final contact with the spacecraft occurred on June 30, 2006, with all 
Level 1 requirements met. By the end of the mission, all ST5 technologies had 
been validated, all on-board attitude control system (ACS) modes had been 
successfully demonstrated, and the desired constellation configurations had been 
achieved to demonstrate the ability of small spacecraft to take quality science 
measurements, However, during those 100 days (ST5 was planned to be a 90- 
day mission), there were a number of anomalies that made achieving the mission 
goals very challenging. 
This paper will discuss: the chronology of the ST5 launch and early operations, 
work performed to diagnose and work-around a sun sensor anomaly, spacecraft 
tests devised to demonstrate correct operation of all onboard ACS modes, the 
maneuver plan performed to achieve the desired constellation, investigations 
performed by members of the ST5 GN&C and Science teams of an anomalous 
spin down condition, and the end-of-life orbit and passivating operations 
performed on the three spacecraft. 
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The Space Technology 5 (ST5) mission is part of the NASA New Millennium Program 
(NMP),  which validates technologies for future science programs. The purpose of ST5 was to 
validate the ability to design and manufacture multiple small spacecraft and operate these 
spacecraft as a system. The project's goal was to dramatically reduce the ight, size, and cost of 
missions while increasing their science capabilities. Results from ST5 I1 be used to design 
future missions usins constellations of spacecraft such as the Magnetospheric MultiScale (MMS) 
mission currently tinder development. The NMP technologies that ST5 validated were a 
miniature communications transponder, a cold gas micro-thruster, variable emittance coatings, 
CMOS ultra-low power radiation tolerant logic, and a low voltage power subsystem. Other new 
technologies and hardware flying on the ST5 spacecraft incl tided a miniature science-grade 
magnetometer, a miniature spinning sun sensor, the spacecraft deployment mechanism, the 
magnetometer deployment boom, an in-house designed, fluid-filled, passive nutation damper, and 
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an X-band antenna. The three defining Level 1 requirements for ST5 were that the project: shall 
design, develop, integrate, test, and operate three full service spacecraft, each with a mass less 
than 25 kg, through the use of breakthrough technologies; shall demonstrate the ability to achieve 
accurate, research quality scientific measurements utilizing a nanosatellite with a mass less than 
25 kg; and shall execute the design, development, test and operation of multiple spacecraft to act 
as a single constellation rather than as individual elements. 
ST5 MISSION OVERVIEW 
Figure 1 shows one of the ST5 spacecraft with its magnetometer boom in the stowed position 
(the structure on the left of the spacecraft is part of the Pegasus Support Structure that holds the 
spacecraft within the launch vehicle) along with a schematic of spacecraft showing the important 
components and with the boom deployed. As is shown on the schematic, the body of the 
spacecraft is just over half a meter long; fully deployed, the magnetometer boom adds another 
three-quarters of a meter to the spacecraft’s length. The spacecraft components that w-ill be 
discussed in this paper include the magnetometer, the sun sensor, the cold-gas micro-thruster, 
and the passive nutation damper. The three ST5 spacecraft were denoted spacecraft 094, 155, and 
224, based on the transponder spacecraft identification numbers of each. 
Figure 1: ST5 Spacecraft Schematic 
Figure 2 shows the three ST5 spacecraft as mounted in the Pegasus Support Structure (PSS). 
In the nominal deployment sequence, just after the Pegasus launch vehicle third stage cutoff 
(3SCO), the launch vehicle would perform a maneuver in order to deploy the spacecraft in their 
nominal operational attitude; spin axis pointed towards the ecliptic poles and solar arrays normal 
to sun. The Spacecraft would then be deployed after third stage cutoff in the following order: the 
forward spacecraft (sc155, top of stack, leftmost in figure) at 3SCO + 200 seconds, the middle 
spacecraft (sc094) at 3SC0+390 seconds, and the aft spacecraft (sc224) at 3SCOi-530 
seconds. The release springs on the PSS provided separation AV on each spacecraft as well as the 
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initial spin. Even though the deployment order of the spacecraft was sc155, sc094, and then 
sc224, because of the dynamics of the three planned orbits and firing of the Pegasus third stage 
attitude control thrusters, the expected rise order was sc155, sc224, and finally sc094. 
Figure 2: The Three ST5 Spacecraft in the Pegasus Support Structure 
Just after deployment, it was planned that the spacecraft would be only meters apart, but 
nominally spin-stabilized and power positive. The initial constellation separation would then 
passively increase due to the relative velocities imparted by their orbit position (true anomaly) at 
deployment and the velocity imparted by the deployment mechanisms. The post-separation and 
two science validation "string-of-pearls" constellations planned for ST5 are shown in Figure 3. 
Post-Sepa rat i on Sei - Val - I Sci - Val - 2 
Figure 3: Planned Spacecraft Constellations 
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SEPARATION, DEPLOYMENT, AND INITIAL ACQUISITION 
The three ST5 spacecraft launched successfully at 14:03:52.69 UTC on March 22, 2006. The 
Orbital Pegasus XL with the ST5 spacecraft aboard w-as dropped over the Pacific Ocean from its 
carrier L-1011 aircraft and its 1st stage solid motor ignition commenced 5 seconds after drop. 
The Pegasus ascent to orbit insertion occurred nominally with the sc155 separating from the PSS 
at 14:13:33.97 UTC, sc094 separating 14:16:43.92 UTC and sc224 separating at 14:19:54.02 
UTC. The insertion orbit was determined to be 67 km high in apogee, resulting in a first 
acquisition time for the first pass 25 seconds later than originally planned. 
In the last few weeks prior to launch, there had been a fair amount of concern both about 
possible recontact between the three spacecraft and about our ability to acquire and track each 
spacecraft using their X-band tracking information. Also, ST5’s 300 x 4570 km orbit meant that 
its dynamics were considerably faster than most missions that use the DSN network, raising 
additional acquisition and tracking concerns. On launch day therefore, there was much relief in 
the control room when initial contact was made with each spacecraft as planned. However, as 
each was contacted, it was obvious that an unexpected anomaly was affecting all three. The 
telemetry point showing the delta time between sun sensor pulses was alternating between a 
smaller and a larger value. Both of these values were smaller than the expected spin period, 
though the sum of the two was approximately equal to the expected spin period for each 
spacecraft. Additionally, there was a flood of downlinked “buffer overrun” event messages from 
each spacecraft. 
In addition to the anomalous conditions apparent from downlinked telemetry, analysis of the 
launch vehicle separation vectors for the three spacecraft showed that the spacecraft deployment 
from the Pegasus third stage was completely out of bounds with what was expected, resulting in 
the forward spacecraft being significantly ahead of the other two and moving away from them at 
high velocity. The rise order was different than expected; sc155 was still in front, but sc094 was 
now the middle spacecraft and sc224 bringing up the rear. Further complicating the situation, it 
was subsequently discovered that the Pegasus‘third stage had ended up within the ST5 
constellation, between sc 155 and sc094. 
In spite of all of this, however, there was no immediate danger to any of the spacecraft. The 
orbit rates of the three spacecraft left no fear of recontact, and while the sun sensor snn pulse 
telemetry was suspect, the elevation angles seemed to be accurate and were showing each 
spacecraft oriented as desired. Being spin-stabilized and power and thermal safe with no other 
time-critical operations, there was time to diagnose the anomalies. 
SUN SENSOR SPURIOUS PULSES 
Approximately four hours after the initial contact with the ST5 spacecraft, the “ST5 
Anomaly Team” that had been set up before launch was activated. This team, along with 
members of the flight operations and flight support team, began to assemble data and information 
to identify the cause of the anomaly. This process was somewhat complicated by the need to 
monitor the continued operation of each of the three spacecraft during each of the real-time 
contacts. However, because they were spin-stabilized and in a safe configuration, there was no 
urgency to prepare for time-critical operations. 
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A fault tree was put together to attempt to diagnose the anomaly. Based on the frequency and 
the contents of the telemetry packet coming down from the spacecraft with sun sensor 
information, it was clear that two packets were being sent down each spin cycle. The sum of the 
sun pulse delta times of two adjacent packets was equal to the expected spin period. The 
conclusion from this was that the sun sensor was producing two sun pulses each spin period. The 
potential causes for the additional sun pulse included in the fault tree included the following: 
0 Reflection of bright object(s) (localized to respective spacecraft), 
Reflection of bright object(s) including Moon, planets, other spacecraft in the string-of- 
pearls formation, 
Hardware electronics; sun pulse timing and threshold related circuit operation, 
Ground support software, and 
* Flight Software, experiencing buffer overflows related to sun sensor packet 
accumii lation. 
Sun Sensor Spurious Pulse Characterization 
Figure 4 shows two views of the Miniature Spinning Sun Sensor (MSSS) used on the ST5 
spacecraft, manufactured by the Adcole Corporation. Each unit consisted of a dual reticle and 
solar cell assembly and processing electronics packaged in one unit. Its outputs consisted of Sun 
pulse, an eleven bit parallel data output, and a thermistor signal. The Sun pulse output was 
nominaIIy generated when the Sun crossed the command plane normal to the sensor. The parallel 
data output, latched upon generation of the Sun pulse, consisted of a gray-coded digital output 
word that is a measure of the angle of the Sun line in the command plane (elevation angle). The 
ST5 flight software (FSW) and electronics used the MSSS data for spacecraft spin rate 
determination, triggering of thruster firings during attitude precession maneuvers, and closed- 
loop sun acquisition maneuvers. MSSS data was also used in support of ground-based spacecraft 
attitude determination and science data processing activities. . 
MSSS Side View MSSS Top View 
Figure 4: Miniature Spinning Sun Sensor 
The search for the cause of the sun sensor anomaly ended the day after launch. As a part of 
the initial fault tree generation on launch day, Adcole was informed of the spurious pulses 
anomaly that were seen. Without providing exact details on the timing of the pulses, by the next 
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morning, Adcole reported back to the ST5 anomaly team that they had reproduced the spurious 
sun pluse effect. This was achieved through test on a spare MSSS Engineering Unit built for 
ST5. Adcole's results showed a spurious pulse occurred approximately 70" in the spin plan in 
advance of the true sun pulse, which was identical to the phenomenon being experienced on each 
spacecraft MSSS. The MSSS was designed to generate a Sun pulse output when the sun crossed 
through the command plane of the sensor, which is nominally perpendicular to the MSSS 
mounting surface. A Sun Pulse is generated when the Automatic Threshold Adjust (ATA) signal 
amplitude is above a preset threshold, and the command signal amplitude exceeds the ATA 
signal amplitude. 
For the true Sun pulse, the ATA signal exceeds its preset threshold by a large margin, and the 
command signal spikes sharply over the ATA as the sun crosses the sensor. The circuit in the 
MSSS that performs the comparison of the command signal to the ATA contains hysteresis, so a 
clean Sun pulse output is generated. However, in testing at Adcole, they discovered that at angles 
70" in advance of the true Sun crossing, the ATA threshold signal is low enough that the ATA 
signal exceeds it and further, that the command signal exceeds it as well. As the command signal 
is illuminated and reaches a level that is greater than the equivalent threshold on the ATA and the 
ATA signal then rises, an anomalous Sun pulse output would be generated. Because the circuit 
that compares the ATA amplitude to its threshold does not contain hysteresis, multiple spurious 
pulses can be generated. This is because the minimum threshold set for the ATA amplitude was 
very low and the command signal also exceeds it. Without hysteresis in this circuit, the Sun pulse 
outputs could chatter, showing multiple spurious pulses within a very short period of time. 
Figure 5: Sun Pulse Delta Times and Elevation Angles 
Figure 5 presents flight data from sc224, showing the A time, defined as the time between 
adjacent pulses, and the corresponding elevation angles reported by the sun sensor at those times. 
Because the spurious pulses are approximately 70" in advance of the true Sun pulse, the signals 
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on THEMIS was eliminated. Further, GSFC ST5 Anomaly Teain recommended that Adcole 
modify their test program to include testing of the sun sensor over the full range of azimuth and 
elevation angles. For past procurements and as procured on ST5, the testing of the sun sensor’s 
response was focused to an output window of *4-5” degrees in spin phase (azimuth) for a zero 
elevation angle (sun line lying in the “equator” of the MSSS) about the zero crossing of the Sun, 
Le., where the sun pulse is issued. Had a wider range of test window about the zero crossing been 
established for the acceptance test program for the ST5 sensors, the spurious pulses would have 
been discovered well before launch. 
Effects of Spurious Pulses on Spacecraft Operations 
For each time the MSSS produced a pulse, whether a true Sun pulse or a spurious one, it 
triggered several actions on the spacecraft. Two of these actions, one in software and one in 
hardware, were of primary concern to the guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) flight 
support and anomaly teains. On the soh -a re  side, each sun pulse would trigger a software 
interrupt service routine (ISR) which would then start the flight software attitude control (AC) 
task. The AC task would then read the elevation angle of the spacecraft and calculate a filtered 
spin rate based on the A time since the last pulse. In the event that that the spacecraft had been 
commanded into its sun acquisition or attitude precession modes, the AC task would also 
calculate the timing and duration of the next cold gas thruster pulse. Note that the buffer overrun 
messages flooding the downlinked event messages were a result of the multiple, closely-spaced 
spurious pulses generated during most spin cycles; while the software was still processing the 
interrupt generated by the first pulse, additional interrupts would occur that the software was not 
able to process and so a buffer overrun would result. 
The hardware action triggered by the MSSS pulses is related to operation of the cold gas 
thruster. For sun acquisition and attitude precession mode, the timing of the thruster firing was 
based on receipt of the Sun pulse. When this pulse is correctly received once per spin period at 
the time of the sun crossing, the pulse provides a very good way of timing thruster firings to 
achieve the desired reorientation of the spacecrafi spin axis. 
Of these two actions, the hardware-based action was the one that was the most problematic. 
The ISR routine that responds to MSSS pulses and the AC task that was used to implement the 
desired actions could be rewritten and patched on-orbit, if necessary. However, there was no way 
to change the hardware action related to thruster firings. When the spacecraft was placed in sun 
acquisition or attitude precession mode, it would calculate thruster firings as a delay and a pulse 
width and write those commands to the thruster hardware command registers. When the next 
MSSS pulse was received, whether it be a true Sun pulse or a spurious one, the thruster hardware 
would then wait out the commanded delay before firing the thruster for the desired pulse width. 
Note that this was not an issue for thruster firings associated with orbit maneuvers, as those were 
fired strictly on a separate 2 Hz clock. If another pulse was received during the delay time of a 
thruster command, processing of that command would stop in favor of the next one (if any). 
The combination of these two actions results in a ”keep-out” zone for thruster firings twice 
the size of the -70” between the spurious pulse(s) and the true Sun pulse (see Figure 7). The 
reason that this keep-out zone is twice the size is not completely obvious. On most spin cycles, 
the AC task would be run twice, once at the time of the true Sun pulse and once at the time of the 
first spurious pulse. If in sun acquisition or attitude precession mode, any thruster pulse 
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commanded would be executed at the time of the next pulse. So, a command generated at the 
time of the true Sun pulse would be executed (after the commanded delay) at the time of the 
spurious pulse, while a command generated by the spurious pulse would be executed at the time 
of the true Sun pulse. 
I 
Figure 7: Attitude Precession Maneuver Restrictions Due to MSSS Anomaly 
First of all, any command generated at the time of the true Sun pulse would probably not be 
executed. The thruster hardware would attempt to execute it at the time of the first spurious 
pulse, but since there are usually multiple spurious pulses, the command would be stopped before 
it could actually fire. This eliminates the first half of the keep-out zone. However, because the 
number of spurious pulses varies, it is possible that such a command could be executed. To 
ensure that thruster commands occur when they are desired, it is necessary to use a minimum 
delay time corresponding to the amount of time between the spurious and true Sun pulse. This 
means there will be no undesired firing triggered by the spmious Sun pulse, but it doubles the 
size of the keep-out zone needed to get desired movement of the spacecraft spin axis. While this 
created a sizable zone during which thruster firings were not permissible, it did not create any 
absolute restrictions on moving the spacecraft spin axis, since it would be possible to orient the 
iixis iis desired using multiple manccvers, if necessary. 
On-Orbit and Operational Tests and Mitigation 
A number of on-orbit fixes were contemplated to deal with the spurious pulses, though only 
two were finally implemented. Had the ST5 mission been of greater duration, it is possible that 
additional fixes would have been performed. However, through the fixes that were used and 
operational methods, all three spacecraft were operated successfiilly during the duration of the 
mission. 
The first on-orbit fix that was implemented was designed to eliminate the flood of buffer 
overrun messages generated by the spurious pulses. While this did not change the functionality 
of the spacecraft, it did allow the event message buffer to become more useful since other 
messages being sent down from the spacecraft could be seen. 
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The second on-orbit software change enacted was not implemented as a fix but was designed 
to collect more information and statistics to characterize the spurious pulses. Figure 8 shows a 
graphic of the some of the data extracted from this test on sc224. It shows the collection of one or 
more spurious pulses received each spin cycle in advance of the true Sun pulse. In most cases, 
there were multiple spurious pulses received within a very short amount of time; as many as ten 
pulses within 8 millisec were observed. 
I 
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Figure 8: MSSS Sun Presence Pulse Characterization 
The only other on-orbit fix applied related to the MSSS anomaly was designed to allow for 
correct spin rate calculation on the spacecraft. Because the spin rate calculation was based on the 
A times between adjacent pulses, the spurious pulses caused the calculated spin rate to be higher 
than actual. Given that the A times for the true and spurious pulses were approximately 20% and 
80% of the true spin period, the calculated spin rates would be higher by a factor of 5 and 1.25, 
respectively. Existing software limits on the calculated spin rate eliminate the calculation that 
was five times too high, so the resultant spin rate calculated onboard was 25% too high. Because 
the onboard spin rate is used in sun acquisition and attitude precession modes to calculate the 
timing of thruster commands, it was important to have this number be accurate. 
Recall from Figure 5 that pulses are occasionally dropped. Looking at data from each of the 
three spacecraft shows that five or ten times a day there is a spin cycle with no spurious pulses at 
all. This fact leads to the method used to calculate a correct spin rate with nothing but simple 
table changes to the flight software. The three steps needed were: 
Change the softi-are limits on minimum and iiiaximiim spin rats to be &IO% ofthe 
expected vaIue, 
Change the software first-order filter coefficients used to filter the spin rate to effectively 
disable the filter, and 
0 Wait. 
By implementing the first two changes, the calculated spin rate “freezes” at the current value, 
which is 25% high, because the calculated value when there is a spurious pulse is always too 
high. However, when a spin cycle occurs where there is no spurious pulse, the spin rate 
calculation gives a correct spin rate within the allowable range, and the spacecraft begins to 
report and use the correct spin rate. This change was implemented on all three spacecraft, and 
within a day each spacecraft began reporting the correct spin rate. 
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CONSTELLATION REPLANNING & MANEUVER PERFORMANCE 
More detail of the ST5 constellation planning and maneuvers is shown in Ref 1; it will be 
covered briefly here to point out the effect of the MSSS anomalies on the ST5 constellation. 
Figure 9 shows the nominal constellation planned and timeframe for maneuvers for the three ST5 
spacecraft. The plan was for the middle spacecraft in the string-of-pearls constellation to be the 
reference spacecraft, with planned in-track separation between it and the leading and following 
spacecraft. After the initial post-deployment separation, the spacecraft would be maneuvered into 
tw-o science validation constellations for approximately 30 days each. 
Ideal Orbit Maneuver Sequence -200 1 
40-100 .- c 
$ 20-60 
Q al rn 
Y 
0 
60-150 k 
2 - 
80-200 
-200 
-Day 54 -Day 75 
Figure 9: Nominal Constellation Plan 
A number of things happened that prevented the original constelIation plan from being 
implemented. As mentioned previously, the rise order of the constellation was different than 
expected, with sc094 the middle spacecraft instead of sc224. The forward spacecraft, sc155 was 
separating much faster than expected with respect to sc094 and sc224. To further complicate 
matters, the Pegasus rocket body ended up within the ST5 constellation, between sc155 and 
sc094. For the first week of the mission, there were tracking data processing issues that resulted 
on lost passes and a loss of quality of the orbit solution. Finally, the sun sensor anomaly raised 
early concerns about the ability of the spacecraft to perform sun acquisition and attitude 
precession operations. Until that capability was demonstrated, the project was reluctant to use the 
thruster for orbit maneuvers. 
All told, this situation resulted in a three-week delay in maneuvering sc155 and resulted in a 
longer time to achieve formation than originally planned. Further, the presence of the Pegasus 
rocket body within the constellation greatly complicated the planning needed to establish the 
science constellations. Figure 10 shows the in-track separation derived from the definitive orbit 
determination of the forward (sc155) and aft (sc224) with respect to sc094. The width of each 
swath shows the relative separation dynamics of a lead-trail formation in an eccentric orbit. Also 
noted are all of the attitude precession (ATT) and orbit (ORB) maneuvers actually performed on 
each spacecraft. 
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Figure 10: Achieved Constellation History 
SPACECRAFT SPINDOWN 
During the first week of operations of the ST5 constellation, the spacecraft flight operations, 
flight support, and anomaly teams were deeply involved in diagnosing and determining how to 
work with the spurious pulses being produced by the sun sensor and by operating the three 
spacecraft. It was during that time, however, that it was first noticed that the spacecraft were all 
spinning down at a faster rate than expected. Once ihe sun sensor anomaly investigation and 
operations worked out, more attention was paid to the spacecraft spin rate decrease and how it 
would affect future operations. 
Initial Discovery 
During the investigations of the sun sensor anomaly, the spacecraft data from the sensor were 
looked at and processed based on “short” and “long” A times. While the information that was 
received from Adcole helped to quickly determine the cause of the anomaly and whether the 
“short” or “long” A times corresponded to the true Sun pulse, the anomaly team continued to 
look at the data from both the true and spurious Sun pulses, as both were needed to calculate 
spacecraft spin rate, elevation, and other parameters. 
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Figure 11 shows a plot of the “short“ and “long” A times for the first four days of the 
mission. It was at this point that it was first noticed that the trend of both sets of A times was 
increasing. Since adding adjacent A times gives the spacecraft spin period, it became clear that 
the spacecraft spin period was increasing and so their spin rates were decreasing. 
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Figure 11: “Short” and “Long” Pulse Delta Times 
Figure 12 shows the instantaneous spin rate of sc094 calculated at the time of each true Sun 
pulse over one orbit, centered at perigee. As can be seen, the spin rate does not uniformly 
decrease over the entire orbit. For this particular orbit of sc094, the spacecraft reaches its highest 
latitude around 1000 sec before perigee. Note- that the spin rate is increasing around spacecraft 
apogee, with a sharper decrease around its point of highest latitude and perigee crossing. 
Cause Investigation 
Once the spin rate decrease was confirmed on all three spacecraft, and shown-to be between 
approximately 0.05 and 0.1 rpm decrease/day, the team began investigating the possible causes. 
Because it was observed on all spacecraft, it was unlikely to be the result of a leakage from the 
cold gas thruster propellant system, and it was confirmed via telemetry that there were no 
unexpected pressure drops from the propellant tanks. Pre-launch analysis of environmental 
torques-atmospheric drag, solar pressure, gravity gradient, and magnetic from spacecraft 
residual dipole-was revisited and it was confirmed that they were too small to produce the 
observed effect. However, one additional environmental torque was examined to explain the 
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spacecraft spin rate decrease that was not analyzed prior to launch. This additional environment 
disturbance w-as torque on the spacecraft caused by the interaction of the Earth’s magnetic field 
with induced eddy currents. 
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Figure 12: Spacecsift 094 Spin Rate Orbit 156 
Using Ref. 2, Dean Tsai of the GN&C flight support team conducted a simulation of the 
spacecraft over several orbits using the 2005 IGRF-10 magnetic field model. The model included 
the residual magnetic moment of the ST5 spacecraft, as measured in ground testing, along with 
an effect due to eddy currents in the spacecraft structure taken from Ref. 2 and scaled to the size 
of ST5. Figure 13 shows the results of this simulation, with the red dashed line representing the 
results of the eddy current simulation and the solid blue line showing representative data from 
sc094 (this plot shows spin rate decrease). This analysis is especially interesting because it 
provides an explanation for both the general downward trend of the spin rate as well as the 
periods during the orbit in which the spin rate is increasing: the increase is caused by the residual 
magnetic dipole while the overall decrease is caused primarily by the induced eddy currents. 
Guan Le and Jim Slavin of the ST5 Science Team also provided another potential explanation of 
the observed Spacecraft spin down, also caused by interaction of the Earth’s magnetic field with 
the spacecraft. The mechanism, which is similar to eddy currents within the spacecraft structure, 
is instead carried by leakage current from the spacecraft structure being closed through the 
surrounding plasma of the Earth’s magnetic field. While the project did not have the resources to 
do enough investigation to identify the exact mechanism for this spin down, the analysis that was 
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performed pretty conclusively showed that it was primarily caused by interaction of the 
spacecraft with the Earth’s magnetic field. 
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Figure 13: Eddy Current Spindown Prediction vs Spacecraft Data 
Mitigation 
Because the three ST5 spacecraft each had only one thruster nominally aligned with the spin 
axis, there was very little that could be done to mitigate the spin rate decrease. Trending analysis 
showed that the spin rates would not get too low to have a negative effect on spacecraft stability 
within the planned 90 day mission, but there was some concern for an extended mission. It was 
hoped that with luck, misalignments of the one thruster with respect to the spin axis might result 
in a spin rate increased when maneuvers were performed. As shown by Figure 14, which plots 
the spacecraft spin rate for each spacecraft around its first orbit maneuvers, it was true that with 
sc094 and sc224, the spin rate increased during the maneuvers. For sc 155, however, the spin rate 
further decreased. In no case, however, was the spin rate change very significant, being the same 
order of magnitude as roughly one day of spin rate change. 
During the investigation of the cause of the spacecraft spin down, it was noted that one of the 
reasons that the eddy current effect was unexpectedly large might be due to the fact that the ST5 
spacecraft had a large metal card cage that ended up being perpendicular to the Earth’s magnetic 
field as the spacecraft approached its point of highest latitude and perigee. Normally, small low 
Earth orbiting spacecraft will be designed to avoid this, but when ST5 was designed it was 
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planned to be in a higher orbit. This suggested one possible experiment that could be made to 
both confirm the influence of the Earth’s magnetic field as a cause of the spin down and to 
mitigate its effect. The experiment was to reorient the spin axis of one of the spacecraft about 
the sun line so that when the spacecraft went through perigee the magnetic field lines would not 
be as perpendicular. This experiment was performed by reorienting sc224. The results of this 
maneuver on the rate of spacecraft spin rate decrease are shown in Figure 15. These results 
provide further confirmation of torque caused by the Earth’s magnetic field as the primary 
contributor to the spacecraft spin down. 
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Figure 14: Effect of Orbit Maneuvers on Spacecraft Spin Rate 
PASSIVE NUTATION DAMPER PERFORMANCE 
Figure 16 shows a picture of one of the passive nutation dampers designed and built at 
Goddard Space Flight Center for use on the ST5 spacecraft. The device passively damps out 
spacecraft nutation, which is defined as the angular displacement between the spacecraft’s major 
principle (spin) axis and the spacecraft’s angular momentum vector and occurs on ST5 following 
spacecraft separation from launch vehicle, magnetic boom deployment, and thruster firings. The 
dampers were fully filled with a viscous silicone fluid. No bellows mechanism was used, thereby 
giving the damper a high internal pressure as well as reducing mass and complexity. The ST5 
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dampers were designed to operate between spin rates of 15 and 40 rpm, and to have a time 
constant of 45 minutes at a nominal spin rate of 28 rpm. 
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Figure 15: Spacecraft 224 Spin Rate with Attitude Reorientation 
Figure 17 shows an example of the nutation damper performance, plotting the elevation 
angle of sc155 after deployment of the magnetic boom. The red dashed line shows the envelope 
of the nutation damping and can be used to calculate the nutation time constant. Table I shows a 
tabular listing of each “disturbance” event on the three ST5 spacecraft, with the corresponding 
spin rate and calculated nutation time constant. This information is depicted graphically in Figure 
18. The nutation damper performed as designed. 
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Figure 16: Nutation Damper Figure 19: Damper Performance for §/@ 155 
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Table 1: Nutation Damper Performance 
Spacecraft 
094 
094 
094 
094 
094 
155 
I55 
155 
155 
155 
155 
155 
155 
155 
224 
224 
224 
224 
224 
224 
224 
224 
Event 
Initial Release 
MAG Boom Deploy 
20 pulse AV 
600 pulse AV 
1500 pulse AV 
Initial Release 
MAG Boom Deploy 
6 pulse Att Mnvr 
155 pulse AV 
140 pulse AV 
130 pulse AV 
76 pulse AV 
400 pulse AV 
1500 pulse AV 
Initial Release 
MAG Boom Deploy 
47 pulse AV 
76 pulse Att Mnvr 
20 pulse AV 
600 pulse AV ~ 
1500 pulse AV 
1500 pulse AV 
Post-Event Spin Rate (rpm) 
35.0 
27.4 
23.8 
20.8 
21.7 
24.6 
19.2 
18.2 
17.6 
17.1 
15.7 
15.0 
13.0 
11.8 
23.8 
18.6 
17.9 
15.1 
14.6 
13.6 
13.0 
12.7 
Time Constant (min) 
32 
30 
39 
47 
46 
50 
51 
59 
64 
68 
70 
79 
103 
124 
51 
64 
66 
85 
87 
100 
115 
112 
SPACECRAFT DISPOSAL 
On June 1, 2006, the ST5 Project received a Notice of Intent to Terminate Operation of 
Space Technology 5 Mission letter from the NASA Science Mission Directorate, directing the 
project to complete end-of-mission activities and cease operations at completion of primary 
mission no earlier than June 30 and no later than Juiy 7, 2006. These dates aIIowed ST5 to 
complete its planned 90 day mission. The end-of-mission (EOM) activities for ST5 were fairly 
simple: disable the onboard spacecraft failure detection and correction, empty the propulsion 
tanks, conduct follow-up passes, and turn off transmitters by not scheduling any further contacts. 
After conducting these operations, the spacecraft would re-enter the atmosphere well within 25 
years and with no debris field, meeting NASA orbital debris requirements. 
The objectives of the EOM maneuver plan were to fire all of the remaining propellant, 
configure the spacecraft orbits for eventual disposal (via orbit decay), and minimize recontact 
probability. The constraints were on spacecraft attitude, available propellant, and operating 
condition limits on the propulsion system. Between June 26 and June 29, 2006, a series of 11 
EOM thruster firings were successfully conducted on the three ST5 spacecraft and final contact 
with them was on June 30,2006. 
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ST-5 Nutation Damper Time Constants 
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Figure 18: Nutation Damper Performance 
CONCLUSION 
During a relatively brief 100 day mission and in the face of a number of anomalies, the three 
ST5 spacecraft were able to successfully satisfy the mission’s level one requirements, primarily 
to design, build, launch and operate three small spacecraft as a constellation in order to achieve 
accurate, research-quality science measurements. Additionally, ST5 successfully demonstrated a 
number of new technologies including a miniature communications transponder, variable 
emittance thermal coatings, a cold-gas micro-thruster, CMOS ultra-low power radiation-tolerant 
logic, a low voltage power subsystem including LiIon battery, and sofiware tools for autonomous 
ground operations. The project held the ST5 Technology Symposium to present their results at 
Goddard Space Flight Center on September 13, 2006. 
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